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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
This paper investigates empirically the reasons for a large price differential between common
(voting) and preferred (non-voting) shares in the Russian stock market. Despite lower dividend on
common shares they have been traded with substantial premium over the price of preferred shares.
The case of Russia is interesting because the average premium on common shares has been much
larger than the premium on voting shares in other countries and has been extremely volatile, which
is not a characteristic of other stock markets.
Empirical analysis focuses on two main explanations relating the premium either to the voting right
attached to common shares or to liquidity differences between the two classes of stock. Two
avenues through which the right to vote may give rise to the premium are distinguished. The
premium may stem from private benefits available to those who control the firm and the possibility
of control fights which make the votes held by small investors pivotal, and therefore valuable. The
other avenue is that non-voting shareholders as a class may be expropriated by voting shareholders,
i.e. through actions that ultimately divert cash flows from the former to the latter. The second
explanation – the liquidity argument – states that (at least a part of) the observed price differential
between voting and non-voting shares may be due to inferior liquidity of the latter class of shares.
The paper examines the relevance of these explanations empirically using case studies and cross-
sectional regression analysis of RTS stock exchange data from 1997-2003. The main findings are as
follows. The data support the hypothesis that the premium is related to private benefits of control and
the possibility of control contests. In particular, a single case study of a contested takeover shows the
relevance of control changes for the size of the premium. Econometric analysis reveals that the
magnitude of the premium is negatively related to the difference between the ownership stakes of the
largest owner and the second largest one. This suggests that the votes of marginal shareholders – those
who trade in the stock market – are more valuable when the two largest shareholders of the firm are of a
similar size (which may eventually lead to a control fight) and become less valuable when ownership is
concentrated in the hands of one party only (implying that control over the firm is unlikely to be
contested). Importantly, this relationship does not change if the largest shareholder has over 50% of
votes. This result can be rationalized if significant minority owners have a certain bargaining power
versus the largest (controlling) shareholder and may seize some of the control benefits.
The study finds no evidence that the premium is related to expropriation of preferred shareholders
as a class. The econometric analysis uses the cross-company variation of the vetoing power of
preferred shareholders in case their “class rights” are concerned as a proxy for the expropriation
risk. Theoretically, such conditional vetoing power should reduce the expropriation risk facing non-
voting shareholders. However, the premium turns out to be unaffected by this factor. The result may
testify either to that the expropriation of preferred shareholders is irrelevant or that the proxy for the
expropriation risk employed in the study is imperfect.
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The explanation based on liquidity finds considerable support – indirectly in the case studies and
explicitly in the econometric analysis. In particular, the premium raises with illiquidity of preferred
stock, the result is significant both statistically and economically.
Yet the control contest model of the voting premium and the liquidity story do not explain much of
the variation of the premium, especially over time. The impact of firm-specific characteristics on
the premium turns out to be of minor importance compared to the impact of a hidden common
factor that seems to be related to changing economic and institutional environment. An exact
answer to the question of what determines a significant variation of the premium over time requires
further research.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the traditional theory of finance, the value of securities is associated with future cash flows
discounted at the rate that reflects their risk. In other words, the value of securities is assumed to
depend on the pecuniary benefits they are entitled to by law or by contract. Other properties of
securities, for example, voting rights attached to company shares, are considered as having no effect
on their prices.
Valuation of dual class stock in the Russian stock market seems to be at odds with this assumption.
In Russia companies are allowed to issue two classes of stock – the so-called common and preferred
shares with the right to vote and entitlement to dividend being the two major differences between
these classes. Common shares bear one vote each while preferred shares are non-voting (except for
a few special cases that are strictly regulated in the corporate law). The latter, however, have
superior dividend rights. Indeed, the history of dividend payments by Russian companies shows that
preferred shareholders have usually received several times as much as common ones. Despite the
disadvantageous position of common shares with respect to dividends, they have been traded with a
substantial premium, up to several hundred percent, over the price of preferred shares.1 Moreover,
the premium has been extremely volatile: it was relatively low in 1996 and 1997, increased
dramatically soon after the outburst of the 1998 financial crisis and declined slowly since 2000. As
an illustration, appendix 1 shows dividends and prices of common and preferred shares for five
large Russian companies.
What can explain the observed premium on common shares in Russia? It is somewhat tempting to
relate the premium to the voting right that is attached to common shares. Indeed, there is an
extensive literature documenting a positive value of the voting right in corporations with dual-class
stock structure across the globe. Empirical studies in developed and developing economies show
that the voting premium – usually estimated for shares that differ with respect to the voting rights
only – ranges from 5.4 to 82% (Becht et al., 2002). It has also been suggested that the value of a
vote is stable in time on the country level (Nenova, 2003). The latter is obviously not the case in
Russia. Moreover, the size of the premium that is paid on common (voting) shares in the country
fell outside the conventional range – the average in 1997-2003 is 118% – and even more so given
the preferential dividend on non-voting shares. These facts question the interpretation of the
premium as “the value of the voting right” and provide a reason for an investigation.
There have been just a few attempts to interpret and to explain the premium on common shares in
Russia. Willer (1997) interprets the premium as evidence of the prime importance of control rights
and suggests that its decline in 1995 – 1996 testifies to that firms started to honor shareholder rights
                                                
1 Hereafter the premium is defined as the difference between the price of a voting share and the price of a non-voting
one divided by the price of a non-voting share.
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and regulatory progress was made. The focus of a recent paper by Goetzman et al. (2003) is on a
particular explanation of the premium: expropriation of preferred shareholders as a class, which
implies actions that ultimately diverts cash flows from preferred shareholders to common ones.
Using a simple perpetual growth model and assuming some plausible levels of the interest rate and
company growth rate, the authors find it difficult to justify the level of the premium by
expropriation only unless some improbable disaster scenarios involving an outright transfer of cash
flow from preferred shareholders to common ones are considered. The impossibility to relate the
premium to the expropriation of preferred shareholders only testifies to the existence of other
determinants of the premium which have not been explored in the mentioned paper. Using a factor
analysis of time-series data referring to share prices of five companies the authors find evidence of a
systematic factor underlying the discrepancy of prices between common and preferred shares in
Russia, and suggest that this factor is related to corporate governance. However, there is still no
clear answer to the question of what determines the premium in Russia.
This paper attempts to explain the difference in valuation of the two classes of stock in Russian
companies on the empirical level. It proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses main characteristics
of dual class stock in the overseas financial markets and in Russia, as well as reasons for the issue
of such stock. Regulations in the Russian corporate law are examined in greater detail in order to
identify potential sources of the differential valuation of common and preferred shares. Section 3
focuses on the explanations for differential valuation of dual-class stock that are proposed in the
literature: the presence of private benefits of control and the possibility of control fights, the
expropriation of non-voting shareholders as a class, and the difference in liquidity between the
two classes of stock. A preliminary assessment of the relevance of these explanations in the
Russian context is carried out in Section 4. Section 5 presents empirical evidence which comes
from two sources: case studies and a cross-sectional econometric analysis. Section 6 discusses the
results.
2. THE INCIDENCE AND REGULATION OF DUAL CLASS STOCK
2.1. Dual class shares in the world
The issue of dual class stock typically implies differentiation of voting rights across classes – a
deviation from the one-share-one-vote rule.2 A significant increase in the use of dual class stock
occurred since the 1980s, in particular in small stock markets (Rydqvist, 1992; Smith and Amoako-
Adu, 1995; Nenova, 2003). Currently a high proportion of listed firms have dual-class structure in
Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Korea, Mexico, Sweden, and
Switzerland. Companies with dual-class stock also exist in Australia, Chile, France, Hong-Kong,
                                                
2 This may be introduced indirectly: Israeli companies, for example, have issued shares entitled to one vote each but
with different par values (Levy, 1983).
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South Africa, the UK, and the US. In some countries, however, the law explicitly forbids
differentiation of voting rights, for example, in Belgium, China, Japan, Singapore, and Spain
(Nenova, 2003).
When shares with differentiated voting right are not explicitly banned by the corporate law, they
are often subject to strict regulations. For example, the French corporate law has allowed three
categories of restricted voting shares: shares that are identical to common ones in all respects,
including dividend entitlement, but can never vote; shares with superior dividend rights and no
voting right as well as shares with superior dividend right and a contingent voting right (which
these shares obtain after three consecutive years of not fully paid dividends) (Muus, 1998). The
regulations often specify the minimum features of the inferior voting or non-voting stock. For
example, an additional dividend and seniority over common stock in the case of company
liquidation have been granted to the so-called savings (non-voting) shares in Italy, which bear no
voting rights (Zingales, 1994). In Germany, preference (non-voting) shares have been entitled by
law to a priority dividend which is to be distributed among preference shareholders before any
dividend payments to common shareholders. These preference shares are cumulative and have a
contingent voting right in case the priority dividend has not been paid in full (Hoffmann-
Burchardi, 1999). In many countries, the issuing companies can further increase the minimum
features of non-voting or restricted voting stock with respect to dividends, contingent rights to
vote or preferred claims.3
In some jurisdictions, the legal status of differentiated voting shares is largely determined by
companies themselves, in their articles of incorporation. With such enabling approach of the
corporate law, a diversity of voting structures may emerge. In these cases, however, restrictions
may be imposed by stock exchanges. For example, differentiated voting shares were prohibited
between 1926 and 1986 in the New York Stock Exchange: companies could get a new listing only
if they issued a single class of voting stock (Seligman, 1986). Similarly, American Stock Exchange
adopted the “Wang formula” which required, for example, that the voting ratio between superior
and inferior voting shares should not be greater than 10:1 and that the latter could elect a minority
of directors (Zingales, 1995).
The main reason behind the issue of differentiated voting shares is that it enables the founders or
controlling shareholders of a firm to raise funds through sale of common stock without jeopardizing
their control over the company (Becht et al., 2002). Besides, the issue of non-voting or restricted
voting shares has been directly promoted by governments of several countries. The purpose has
been to retain either government or national control over important enterprises while allowing them
to issue common stock. For example, state-controlled companies in France used to issue non-voting
shares in order not to undermine the controlling position of the state (Muus, 1998) and low vote
stock was issued to foreign investors in Sweden in order to limit their influence in national
companies (Bergström and Rydqvist, 1990).
                                                
3 A review of dual class shares in Europe is contained in McCahery et al. (2003).
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2.2. Common and preferred shares in Russia
Dual class shares were authorized in Russia in 1992, when a major presidential decree on
privatization was enacted.4 This document established three basic models of privatizing state-owned
enterprises as well as provided a standard corporate charter, which all privatized companies had to
adopt. According to the decree, enterprises that followed the so-called “first option” of privatization
(as a rule, relatively capital-intensive firms that could not be bought out by their managers and
employees under other options due to the wealth constraints) were re-established as companies with
up to 25% of their charter capital represented by preferred shares. During the first stage of
privatization, these shares were exclusively distributed to company employees and retirees for free.5
In Russia, the decision to have dual class stock was largely not a company’s choice, but a
consequence of the privatization regulations.
The legal status of the two classes of shares was initially specified in the standard corporate charter.
While the rights attached to common shares were generally quite similar to those existing in most
other countries (they are basically reduced to the right to vote at shareholder meetings and the right to
receive dividends, which, however, are indefinite), the status of preferred shares was peculiar. First,
they could never make up more than 25% of the charter capital and had to have the same par value as
common shares. Second, each year the preferred stock of a company was entitled to a dividend
equivalent to 10% of the company net profit.6 Third, the dividend per preferred share could not be
lower than and had to be paid before the dividend per common share. Fourth, preferred shareholders
were granted special rights in the event of liquidation. In particular, they had the right to get
announced but unpaid dividends as well as the face value of their shares (provided that creditor claims
were satisfied). Remaining assets were to be distributed among all categories of shareholders in
proportion to their fractional ownership. Finally and most important, some provisions concerned
voting rights. Usually preferred shareholders did not have the right to vote. However, the standard
charter endowed them with the right to vote on decisions that involved their interests as well as on
every decision in case the dividend on preferred shares was not paid or was not paid in full (temporary
enfranchisement). Moreover, preferred shareholders even had a vetoing power on decisions that
involved their “class rights” – such decisions (changes in corporate charters concerning dividends,
rights in liquidation, etc.) had to be approved by two thirds of the votes of preferred shareholders
attending shareholder meeting. Finally, some charters were drafted to contain the provision that
preferred shares could be converted into common ones, usually under certain conditions.7
                                                
4 Presidential Decree No. 721 dated 1 July 1992 “On organizational measures on transformation of state enterprises,
voluntary associations of state enterprises into joint-stock companies”.
5 An account of the Russian privatization is provided, for example, in Hare and Muravyev (2003).
6 This rule held for companies with exactly one quarter of equity represented by preferred shares. In case this fraction
was smaller, the share of net profit allocated to dividends on preferred stock was typically reduced proportionally.
7 The most famous case is Norilsk Nickel company whose preferred shares could be converted into common ones at
will of their holders, but only after the sale of at least one share from the block that was originally retained in state
ownership.
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Changes in the status of preferred shares were introduced with the enactment of the law on joint-
stock companies in July 1996. Most importantly, the law did not contain the provision that preferred
shareholders could block corporate charters amendments that involved their interests. When such
amendments were on the agenda, these shareholders were granted just one vote per share, with the
possibility of voting together with common shareholders. Given that preferred shareholders held
only 25% of equity at best, as a group they could not veto any resolution of shareholder meetings. A
large fraction of companies changed the rule regulating the voting power of preferred shareholders
strictly in accordance with the law. However, the law itself did not require automatic removal of the
preferred shareholders’ vetoing power. In fact, many companies continued to keep the respective
rule in their charters.8
Not less importantly, the law did not confirm the old rule that 10% of the company net profit had to
be paid as dividends on preferred stock. Neither did it require that the dividend on preferred share
had to exceed the dividend on common one. Firms that issued preferred stock were required “to
determine the dividend on preferred share”, either as a fixed amount, percentage of net profit or any
other precise way. This loose provision, especially when combined with the loss of the vetoing
power by preferred shareholders, facilitated variation in the dividend rights attached to preferred
stock.9
In 2001, shareholder rights were substantially modified through amendments in the corporate law
aimed at better protection of minority shareholders. A crucial change affecting preferred
shareholders solely was that they regained the vetoing power on corporate charter amendments that
involved their interests. Starting from January 2002 such changes have to be approved by 75% of
the votes of preferred shareholders participating in shareholder meeting, and these votes are to be
counted separately from the votes of common shareholders.
To summarize, since their introduction in 1992, preferred shares have enjoyed a number of
advantages of a pecuniary character over common shares. The apparent disadvantages have been
the absence of the voting right and the possibility of “class rights” changes detrimental to preferred
shareholders (especially until 2002 when the vetoing power of preferred shareholders was instituted
                                                
8 By 1998 about one-half of the companies that had issued preferred shares eliminated from their charters the rule on the
vetoing power of preferred shareholders (Securities Market, 1998). The reasons for retaining or removing this rule are
not clear: for example, most regional telecommunication companies (a famous exception is MGTS – Moscow City
Telephone Company) did abolish the rule while most regional power utilities preserved it. In both sectors the regional
companies are controlled by state holdings – Svyazinvest (again, MGTS is an exception) and Unified Energy Systems
respectively.
9 During the last years, changes in the rules regulating dividend on preferred shares did occur, but not very frequently.
For example, most telecommunication companies and power utilities still stick to the old ten-percent-of-net-profit rule
(Securities Market, 2001a). The companies that changed the rule (typically reducing the dividend on preferred shares)
include Megionneftegas, which replaced 10% of the net profit with 1%, Khantymansiyskokrtelecom, which introduced
a fixed dividend equal to 10% of the face value of its preferred shares, Baltica Brewery which calculates dividends on
preferred shares using the Savings Bank (Sberbank) interest rate. Even in such cases, the dividend per preferred share
typically remains bounded below by the dividend per common share.
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in the law). In order words, preferred shares have presumably born an additional risk, namely the
risk of expropriation by common shareholders.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The existing literature relates differential valuation of dual class stock either to differential voting
rights or to liquidity differences between the classes of stock. In turn, there are two avenues through
which the right to vote may give rise to the premium. Firstly, the premium may stem from private
benefits available to those who control the firm and the possibility of control fights which make the
votes held by small investors pivotal, and therefore valuable, as shown by Grossman and Hart
(1988), Zingales (1995) and Rydqvist (1996), among others. Secondly, non-voting shareholders as
a class may be expropriated by voting shareholders, i.e. through actions that ultimately divert cash
flows from the former to the latter. The liquidity argument simply states that a less liquid class of
shares should be traded with a discount.
3.1. The control contest model and the value of the voting right
The cornerstone of this explanation of the premium is the existence of the so-called private benefits
of control that can be appropriated by the party which controls the firm. Besides dividends and
capital gains, which are shared with other shareholders, the controlling shareholders (or managers)
can benefit from high wages, transfer pricing, and payments in kind or simply receive psychological
benefits from being in control over the firm. These benefits are often extracted by the controlling
owner to the detriment of minority shareholders, implying expropriation of the latter. Minority
shareholders, however, cannot do much about such expropriation due to non-verifiable nature of the
control benefits. If these private benefits could be evaluated they would immediately loose their
“privacy” and minority shareholders could bring in a lawsuit against the corporation or the
controlling owner.10
The market price of shares reflects their value to the marginal investor who has no means to enjoy
private benefits of control. Why then is the voting stock priced with premium? The theory says that
investors attach some value to the voting right as long as there is competition among different
                                                
10 The theory suggests that incentives for expropriation increase with the gap between the control rights and the cash-
flow rights, as first shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Hence, a link between expropriation and firm-specific
characteristics such as the distribution of ownership, the size of assets under control, etc. On the country level,
expropriation seems to be strongly influenced by the institutional and economic environment. For example, it has been
argued that the incentives to expropriate tend to rise in bad states of nature when the opportunities of raising additional
funds in the market are limited (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Recent papers that exploit the legal approach to corporate
governance show that private benefits of control depend on the legal norms protecting minority shareholders and on the
quality of law enforcement in a particular jurisdiction (see, e.g., La Porta et al. 1999; Johnson et al., 2000) as well as on
a number of extra legal institutions such as competition, internal norms, pressure from labour, media diffusion, and tax
enforcement (Dyck and Zingales, 2002).
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management teams to acquire these votes. Voting shares have higher prices in the stock market
since even a small fraction of them may be pivotal in a control contest while non-voting shares are
irrelevant in battles for control. Consequently, the voting premium reflects the price a potential
bidder would be willing to pay to atomistic holders of voting stock in order to establish control over
the company and thus may be interpreted as a measure of the private benefits of control.11
A formal model of differential premium is provided by Zingales (1995). Assuming that 1) a
company has two classes of shares which are identical in all respects except for the right to vote
(one class has all votes), 2) there is competition for control over the firm among two parties
(contested tender offer), 3) a bid involves all the shares of the company, both voting and non-
voting, though they may have different prices, he shows that the voting premium is equal to the
ratio between the value of the private benefits of control and the value of cash flow rights (the
present value of corporate benefits distributed pro rata to shareholders) divided by the fraction of
voting shares in the company’s equity. In mathematical terms, the following expression for the
voting premium arises:
VPCC = (B/y) (1/π),  (1)
where VPCC denotes the voting premium in the event of a control contest, B measures the size of the
private benefits of control, y indicates the value of cash flow rights, and π represents the proportion of
voting shares outstanding. The intuition behind π is that when the fraction of voting shares becomes
larger, so does the number of shares among which the benefits of control are to be distributed.
This model applies only in the event of a control contest. Zingales (1995) then argues that the
voting premium observed in daily trading should reflect the expectation of different prices of the
two classes of stock in case of such an event. Therefore, it should be equal to the voting premium
during a control contest times the probability (Φ) that such an event will take place:
VP = Φ VPCC = Φ (B/y) (1/π). (2)
Thus, according to the model, there are three major determinants of the magnitude of the voting
premium: the relative size of the private benefits of control (B/y), the probability of a control
contest, and the fraction of the voting stock in the company’s equity. The probability Φ of a
contested tender offer directly depends on the ownership structure of companies: it is zero if a
company has a majority shareholder, positive but small if there is one large owner and all other
shareholders are small, and large when there are multiple large shareholders with similar stakes
while the remaining shares are distributed among small owners.12
                                                
11 Obviously, the price of the votes that comprise a controlling block is bounded above by the expected value of private
benefits of the acquirer. An alternative way to measure private benefits of control is to look at the difference between
the price of shares in transactions involving control block change and the share price in the stock market after the
announcement of the control block sale (Barclay and Holderness, 1989).
12 Strictly speaking, even in the case of majority control there remains a probability that the controlling shareholder will
sell a part of the shares (e.g., the state may implement a partial of full privatization) or the controlling coalition will
come apart. Hence, majority control does not completely prevent the possibility of future control fights.
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Pros and cons. The model is well-suited for the institutional environment where companies tend to
have no controlling shareholders and there exists an active market for corporate control with intense
competition. If takeovers are not contested, no fraction of private benefits of a potential winner can
be extracted by minority voting shareholders: the bid price will be equal to the expected cash flow
benefits under new management (the minimum price sufficient to overcome the free-rider problem)
which is the same for both classes of shares (Zingales, 1995).
The assumptions of the model are rather binding. An active market for corporate control does not
exist in most countries of the world (Denis and McConnel, 2002). Even in the US and UK, the two
countries where takeovers are frequent, the fraction of hostile takeovers is very small (Becht, 2002).
In most other countries of the world, concentrated ownership structures prevail (La Porta et al.,
1999) and control transactions typically take the form of off-exchange block trades that do not
involve minority shareholders. In this institutional environment, the price of the controlling block is
usually set in the bargaining process between the incumbent and the acquirer; hence, minority
voting shareholders fare no better than non-voting shareholders. Empirical evidence seems to
confirm this view. For example, Franks and Mayer (2001) find that changes in control through
block trades in Germany bring limited gains that accrue only to the large blockholders.
An important issue is takeover regulations. The model assumes that the law, stock market
regulations and corporate charter provisions do not require a control contestant to offer all classes
of shares the same tender price. If they do, the premium disappears straight away. If, in contrast, the
law introduces a mandatory bid rule within the class of voting shares only, e.g. when a bidder is
required to pay minority voting shareholders the same price as for the controlling block of shares,
the premium remains.
Finally, takeover regulations not only affect the division of rents between existing shareholders and
potential winners of control, but also the probability of launching a takeover attempt. While stricter
regulations help minority shareholders to obtain a greater fraction of the private benefits that can be
enjoyed by the party in control, they reduce the probability of launching a takeover. Hence,
takeover regulations may have an ambiguous effect on the voting premium. These issues have
received considerable attention in the literature and are reviewed in Becht et al. (2002).
Though the assumptions of the model are not very realistic in the institutional environments that
prevail in the world, it has been supported in many empirical studies and remains the dominant
explanation of the voting premium. For example, Zingales (1994) reports that the premium in Italy
is directly related to the value of control and varies according to the ownership structure and the
concentration of the voting rights. Rydqvist (1996) focuses on the link between the voting premium
and the ownership structure in Sweden and reports that the premium is larger in companies where
the two biggest blockholders are of equal size – which increases the probability of a control contest
– than in firms where the first blockholder is much larger than the second one. The control contest
model underlies the analysis of the voting premium by Nicodano (1998), who focuses on the effect
of pyramiding, an additional deviation from the one-share-one-vote rule, in Italy; by Hoffmann-
Burchardi (1999), who studies the role of institutional and regulatory environment in Germany and
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finds lower voting premium in companies that accepted the mandatory bid rule; by Nenova (2003)
whose innovative study focuses on the institutional determinants of the value of controlling blocks
using a cross-country sample of firms.
3.2. Expropriation of non-voting shareholders as a class
Extraction of private benefits of control often, though not always, involves expropriation of
minority shareholders. The control contest model sketched above assumes that the extraction of
private benefits is detrimental to voting shareholders to the same extent as to non-voting ones, but
the former are able to recover at least a part of the loss if control over the company can be
contested.
Another possibility is expropriation of non-voting shareholders only. Such expropriation implies
diverting cash flows from non-voting shareholders to voting ones either through explicit changes in
the corporate charter that reduce cash flow rights of the former group or through more sophisticated
techniques such as share swaps in mergers. This scenario is not implausible: voting shareholders
may have both incentives and power to make such decisions. Given the complete separation
between cash flow rights and control rights in the case of non-voting shares, a particularly strong
protection may be needed for non-voting shareholders.13 As in the general case of minority
shareholder expropriation, this comes from both legal and extra-legal mechanisms.
Usually this issue is explicitly addressed in the corporate law, for example, by strictly linking the
dividend and other features of non-voting shares to the analogous features of voting shares. In more
flexible regulatory environments that permit varying the rights attached to non-voting stock, the law
typically requires a majority consent of the holders of those shares when a change in their “class
rights” is on the agenda (i.e., the shareholders are granted a conditional right to vote). Yet it is far
from obvious that even with these mechanisms the protection of non-voting shareholders is not
worse than that of voting ones. Explicit legal norms may simply fail to cover all eventualities. The
conditional right to vote may also be ineffective due to the free rider problem facing non-voting
shareholders. This assumption is valid if voting and non-voting shares tend to be held by different
investors with non-voting shares being heavily dispersed, which is not unusual.14 Indeed, non-
negligible blocks of voting shares are often held in order to exert some influence over the company.
In contrast, there is no strong reason for keeping non-voting shares concentrated since the
conditional right to vote is rarely activated and is always limited in scope. If non-voting shares are
heavily dispersed, their holders are likely to free-ride and not use their conditional right to vote
which facilitates “class rights” changes.
                                                
13 The threat of losing reputation in the stock market is not a sufficient barrier for such behaviour, especially in
economic downturns when the prospects of raising funds in the market are dim, as argued by Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) and Johnson and Shleifer (2001).
14 For example, non-voting savings shares in Italy were introduced specifically to promote stock ownership among
small investors (Zingales, 1994); the Russian privatisation program allocated non-voting shares exclusively among
company employees and retirees which resulted in a large dispersion of these shares.
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3.3. Differences in liquidity
Since the studies by Stoll and Whaley (1983) and Amihud and Mendelson (1986), the role of
liquidity for valuation of securities is widely acknowledged: higher liquidity ceteris paribus
contributes to higher prices. The logic is simple: the less liquid security should have higher trading
costs which should be reflected in a lower price of that instrument. Moreover, the effect of trading
costs is not of second-order and may be considerable since these costs have to be incurred every
time the asset is traded.
Pros and cons. Measuring liquidity of a stock is somewhat controversial: there is no single measure
that captures all essential aspects of liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991).15 It is even more
complicated to judge relative liquidity of dual class shares. For example, these classes typically
constitute unequal proportions of company equity and are issued in different numbers. Other things
being equal, the larger the fraction of a particular class in company equity, the higher its liquidity
compared to the other class. However, for corporate control reasons voting shares may be held more
concentrated than non-voting stock. Hence, a large share of voting stock may be not traded in the
market. As a result, when the fraction of non-voting stock is relatively small, the number and the
volume of transactions may be larger for common stock while the ratio of the number of shares
traded in the stock exchange to the total number of shares may be larger for preferred stock.
Empirical evidence of the effect of liquidity on dual-class stock prices is mixed. For example, Smith
and Amoako-Adu (1995) find no compelling evidence that liquidity – measured by turnover –
matters for the voting premium in Canada. No effect of liquidity measured by the average trading
volume in the superior class divided by the average trading volume in the inferior voting class is
reported by Zingales (1995) for the US and Chung and Kim (1999) for Korea. However, Nenova
(2003) reports a significant effect of liquidity (proxied by log-difference in turnover and bid-ask
spread) on the value of corporate voting rights from cross-country data analysis and warns against
biases that may arise if liquidity is not properly controlled for.
4. INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE VALIDITY OF VARIOUS
EXPLANATIONS IN THE RUSSIAN CONTEXT
4.1. The control contest model of the voting premium
Private benefits of control. It is widely agreed upon that the corporate governance standards in
Russia are inferior to those in the well-developed markets and the opportunities of controlling
shareholders to extract private benefits are immense. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
                                                
15 The traditional measure is the ratio of the volume of transactions (in monetary terms) to the average absolute
percentage change in price. Instead of the volume of trade proxies, liquidity may be measured by the number of
transactions, the spread between ask and bid prices, the number of days between the end of the month and the day of the
previous recorded stock exchange transaction, etc.
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suggest that in the mid-1990s Russian managers could appropriate up to 99% of the profit of the
companies they run. Black et al. (2000) refer to the cases of transfer pricing in Russian oil
companies which sold production at below market prices to offshore firms that were affiliated with
controlling shareholders/managers of these oil companies. Such cases provide a strong argument for
the relevance of the control contest model in the Russian case: a high premium on common stock is
perfectly consistent with large private benefits of control.
Ownership structure. An immediate objection to the above supposition comes from a single glance
at the ownership structure of the publicly traded companies in Russia. The ownership structure of
the companies that are traded in the RTS16 is highly concentrated and most of them have a
controlling shareholder who wields over 50% of votes. For example, among the companies whose
common and preferred shares were regularly traded in the RTS between 1997 and 2003, only 16%
did not have a controlling owner.17 This observation implies that the probability of a control contest
is very small, if not zero, which casts doubts on the relevance of the control contest model.18
Another important observation that questions, in turn, the last argument is that the controlling
shareholder in many companies that have common and preferred shares outstanding has been the
state, either directly or through state holding companies like Svyazinvest, Unified Energy Systems,
Rosneft, Slavneft, ONAKO, etc. One may therefore hypothesize that the voting premium exists due
to the anticipation by the market that the state will gradually privatize these companies which will
eventually open up the window for control contests. Thus, the identity of a controlling shareholder
may matter for the probability of control contest.
Takeover regulations. The takeover regulations in Russia are not stringent. The article 80 of the
Law on Joint Stock Companies requires a party that has purchased at least 30 percent of common
shares to make an offer to the remaining common shareholders at the market price but not less than
the average price over the six-month period before the purchase of the block. Importantly, the price
at which the offer has to be made is not linked to the price paid for the controlling block. And the
rule itself creates an ample room for different appraisals of the offer price, especially if company
shares are illiquid. Hence, even when an offer to minority shareholders is made, it may be at a large
discount to the price of a share in the controlling block.
4.2. Expropriation of preferred shareholders as a class
The analysis of the legal status of the two classes of stock in Russia in Section 2.2 indicates
insecurity of the status of preferred shares, which was particularly pronounced until the vetoing
                                                
16 RTS stands for the Russian Trading System, the first electronic trading system in Russia established in September
1995, and transformed into RTS Stock Exchange in 1997.
17 These data are available from the descriptive statistics of the sample which are shown in Appendix 4.
18 A substantial number of mergers and acquisitions in Russia are reported in the Datastream; however, they have
typically involved companies that are not listed on the stock exchange and have been carried out through large block
sales.
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power of preferred shareholders was introduced in the corporate law in 2002. Indeed, changes in the
corporate charters that disfavor preferred shareholders did occur (see footnote 10 in Section 2.2
above). Besides immediate changes in the corporate charter concerning dividend rights,
expropriation took place, for example, through swaps during mergers or through arbitrary
interpretation of the term “net profit” on which the dividend on preferred shares is functionally
dependent while the dividend on common shares is not.19
In part, the reason for such expropriation lies in the very design of the security-voting structure of
Russian companies. The issue of dual class stock was determined by the privatization regulations
rather than by shareholders and managers of companies. The security-voting structure created by
privatization may be inefficient (for example, the requirement to allocate 10% of net profit to
dividends on preferred stock restricts the choice of investment projects the firm can finance from
retained earnings).
4.3. Different liquidity of the two classes of stock
Several features of the privatization process in Russia predetermined lower liquidity of preferred
shares compared to common ones, especially in earlier stages of the development of the stock
market. First, the share of preferred stock was restricted to 25% of equity at most. Second, the
allocation of preferred stock in negligible fractions among company employees only made it
virtually non-tradable for a long time. The purchase of these shares from employees – which was
necessary to build up standard tradable lots – took considerable time. In contrast, large fractions of
common stock were sold to institutional investors at voucher and money auctions encouraging
trading activity in the market.
Most conventional measures of liquidity – based on the number of transactions, the turnover
volumes or the bid-ask spread – show that preferred shares in Russia have been less liquid than
common ones (e.g., Securities Market, 2001b). Hence, the liquidity argument may be relevant for
explaining the differential valuation of dual class stock in Russia.
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DUAL CLASS STOCK IN RUSSIA
The determinants of the differential valuation of dual class stock have been studied using several
methodological approaches: case studies (see e.g., Lease et al., 1984; Zingales, 1995), event studies
(e.g., Doidge, 2003) and regression analyses of cross-sectional or panel data (Zingales, 1995; Smith
                                                
19 Surgutneftegas is an example of the latter opportunity. Despite the fact that the company retains the ten-percent-of-
net-profit rule in its charter, the dividends on its preferred shares have been several times smaller compared to what the
rule actually implies. The reason lies in a peculiar interpretation of the term “net profit”: to calculate it, the company
subtracts capital expenditures and several other items from the after-tax profit. An attempt of the preferred shareholders
to force the company to stick to the rule by initiating a lawsuit failed as the term “net profit” is not explicitly defined in
the law.
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 18
and Amoako-Adu, 1995; Chung and Kim, 1999). Among the three, the applicability of the event
study methodology in the Russian stock market raises the greatest concern.20 Therefore, the
empirical analysis that follows relies upon five case studies and a cross-sectional econometric
analysis.
5.1. Case study evidence
This section presents case-study evidence on the reaction of the premium to several types of
corporate events: a contested takeover, a corporate charter change detrimental to preferred
shareholders, and a conversion of preferred shares.
5.1.1. Takeover of GAZ
Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod (GAZ) is the second-largest automaker in Russia whose equity has
been split between common and preferred shares in proportion of 75 to 25%. Common shares have
been traded in the RTS since 1995 while preferred stock became listed in 1999.
In 2000 the company was taken over by Siberian Aluminum group. The exact date when the
takeover attempt was launched is unknown (shares were being bought secretly, without a public
offer). According to the financial press, an aggressive and stealthy attack was launched in late
September 2000.21 By mid-November 2000, the predator was able to acquire from 25% to 50% of
the GAZ voting shares. The exact figure is unavailable as most shares were held by nominees and
the ultimate owners were not disclosed. Nevertheless, company reports to the Federal Commission
for the Securities Market (FCSM) show a rapid concentration of ownership in the hands of one
nominee holder whose voting stake rose from 12% in the second quarter to 43% in the fourth one.
Moreover, the reports to the FCSM suggest that the control block was consolidated in a series of
block transactions. Additional evidence in support of this conjecture comes from data on share trade
in the RTS: during the takeover period (September – November), the volume of transactions with
company common stock was less than 2% of the total number of voting shares outstanding.
An immediate consequence of the takeover was a company board meeting on 29 November, 2000
which convened an extraordinary meeting of shareholders and introduced some changes in the
                                                
20 One problem is a small number of observations corresponding to each type of events in 1997-2003. A more
fundamental problem is the inability to identify the exact timing of many events. Event studies are used to investigate
the effect of unanticipated events and rely on the efficient market theory that assumes near perfect information in the
stock market. In Russia, the low transparency of companies and the presence of insider trading in the market of which
there is abundant evidence (see, e.g., case 3 below) undermine the usefulness of this approach. If information on a
prospective event leaks out before being publicly announced, the reaction of the stock market is gradual rather than
instantaneous. The best the researcher can do in this case is to increase the width of the event window, but this reduces
the power of event studies.
21 Additional evidence of that the takeover was contested comes from the GAZ reports to the Federal Commission for
the Securities Market (FCSM) on changes in the ownership structure. In particular, during the takeover period there was
an increase in the fraction of GAZ shares held by GAZinvest – a firm that is mainly (52.8%) owned by GAZ itself. This
seems to be an attempt of the incumbent management to prevent the takeover.
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management team. Further changes such as election of a new board followed in January 2001, at the
extraordinary shareholder meeting.
A reaction of the premium to the event may be judged by comparing the premium some time before
the probable launch of the takeover attempt, during the takeover period, and afterwards. If the
control contest model holds, one would expect that the premium raised during the acquisition period
and declined to a new minimum after the success of the takeover had become apparent. In what
follows the takeover period is assumed to last from mid-September to November 29 (the date of the
board meeting that revealed success of the acquisition). The choice of the pre-acquisition period is
severely restricted since preferred shares stayed illiquid for the most part of the year.22 There were
two transactions with preferred stock in August and no transactions between March and July as well
as in September. The common stock was more liquid – there were 10 transactions in August 2000.
Therefore, the pre-acquisition period may be defined as the entire month of August 2000. Post-
acquisition period is defined as the period between 30 November (the day after the board meeting)
and the end of the year. There were two transactions with preferred stock within the post-acquisition
period and only one transaction with common shares. Fig. 1 shows the dynamics of prices of
common and preferred stock around the takeover period (August 2000 – February 2001).
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Fig. 1. Prices of common and preferred stock of GAZ around the takeover, USD
The graph shows a large increase of the common stock price within the takeover period – from
around $35 up to $53 and a strong decline afterwards. The price of preferred stock also declined in
the post-acquisition period, but to a lesser extent. Using average prices of common and preferred
shares (volumes of trade are the weights) in each of the three periods, one finds that the premium
increased from 305% in the pre-takeover period to 374% in September-November and declined
subsequently to 207%.
                                                
22 There were 263 registered transactions with common shares of GAZ and only 14 transactions with preferred stock
during the entire year of 2000.
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However, it is not clear whether the fall in the voting premium is indeed related to the takeover and
does not just reflect a common trend in the market. To check whether this is indeed the case, the
GAZ voting premium is adjusted for the average voting premium in the Russian stock market which
is estimated as the equally-weighted average of the premium in three large companies: Unified
Energy Systems, Surgutneftegaz and Rostelecom (see Appendix 2 for details).
The market-adjusted premium on GAZ common shares is depicted in Fig. 2 (this is a simple
difference between the GAZ premium and the market premium). It shows that the premium
experienced a jump during the takeover period and declined afterwards.
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Fig. 2. Premium on GAZ common shares
With adjustment for the market-average premium the GAZ premium changed from 142% to 227%
and 64% respectively. The jump of the GAZ premium in the takeover period and subsequent
decline provide some evidence of the relevance of the control contest model.
However, even after the successful takeover a substantial voting premium (above the market-
average) remained. This hints on a possible impact of other factors such as expropriation risks or
liquidity. The latter factor may be particularly relevant since the number of transactions with GAZ
preferred stock has been very low.
5.1.2. Change in the dividend rule in Avtovaz
Avtovaz is the largest automaker in Russia producing Samara-Lada cars. Its common and preferred
shares are issued in the proportion of 85 to 15% and have been listed in the RTS since 1998.
At the 2002 annual shareholder meeting the ten-percent-of-net profit rule was removed from the
corporate charter, which was apparently done in order to reduce dividends on preferred shares,
as the company history of dividend payments suggests. In particular, up to 2001 Avtovaz
always reported losses and dividends could not simply be paid. At that time there were no
attempts to change the dividend rule. The first year when the company reported a positive profit
was 2001. Preferred shareholders were expected to receive a dividend in accordance with the
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ten-percent-of-net-profit rule and this immediately brought the issue of charter amendments to
the agenda.
The amendment to the charter, however, was made without supermajority approval of preferred
shareholders: at the meeting, the votes of common and preferred shareholders were counted
together and not separately, which is required by the law. The charter change was later challenged
in the court. Until the final ruling, a temporary ban was imposed on any decision of the company
that concerned dividends on preferred shares. In particular, the board of directors was banned from
making proposals on dividend payments to the 2003 annual shareholders meeting. However, just
before the meeting the company obtained a ruling of another court which prescribed the company to
determine the dividend for the 2002 financial year. The two contradictory rulings allowed the board
to make a proposal on the size of dividends which was later accepted by the annual shareholder
meeting.
The event of interest is the change in the dividend rule. The exact date of the event is known (the
meeting was held on Saturday, May 25, 2002). However, there remains a question of whether the
event was completely unexpected by the market: the agenda of the shareholder meeting, including
the proposal to change the dividend rule, was approved on April 25, 2002.
The dynamics of the prices of common and preferred shares around the event date (March 25 – June
25, 2002) is shown on Fig. 3 while the premium on Avtovaz common stock is depicted in Fig. 4.
There were no transactions with preferred shares during the first trading day after the event
(Monday, May 27) so that an immediate reaction cannot be figured out. A fairly flat pattern of share
prices and no apparent break in the premium cast doubts on whether the market reacted to the event
that apparently disfavored preferred shareholders.
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Fig. 3. Avtovaz share prices around the event date, USD
More specifically, by calculating the premium based on average prices of the two classes of stock
one week before the event ($37.080 for common and $16.973 for preferred) and one week after it
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($37.181 and $16.992 respectively), one finds a change in the premium from 118.5% to 118.8%,
which is negligible (volumes of trade are used as weights).
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Fig. 4. The premium on Avtovaz common shares
The change in the adjusted increases somewhat since the market premium averaged 71.2% and
70.4% one week before and one week after the event. Nevertheless, one may conclude that even if
there was a negative reaction of the market on the corporate charter change, it was almost
negligible.
5.1.3. Conversion of LUKoil preferred stock
LUKoil has been among the three largest oil companies in Russia. Initially, the stock of the
company was split between common and preferred shares in the proportion of 91 to 9%. LUKoil
common shares entered the RTS listing in 1995 and preferred shares followed in 1996.
In 2001 LUKoil converted its preferred shares into common ones in proportion of one to one. The
conversion was initiated by the management team and was intended to eliminate “a serious
violation of the shareholder rights”. As explained by L. Fedun, a LUKoil vice-president, the
company allocated a certain fraction of its net profit to dividends and the lion share went to
preferred shareholders, which was considered unjust. Despite the fact that preferred shares
constituted about 9% of the charter capital, they received over half of the dividends paid by the
company.
Interestingly, the first official information about prospective conversion of preferred shares
appeared at the beginning of April 2001 when the LUKoil board of directors adopted the agenda for
the annual shareholder meeting and proposed conversion of preferred shares into common one in
proportion of one to one. However, the difference in prices of the two classes of stock virtually
disappeared already in December 2000, i.e. four months before the official announcement that the
conversion issue would be voted at the shareholder meeting. The dynamics of the premium on
LUKoil common shares is shown in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. LUKoil premium on common stock
This case shows that the premium disappears when preferred shares become convertible. In
addition, the case provides strong evidence of the presence of insider information and insider
trading in the stock market (absent that, why the premium declined after the 1998 crisis relative to
the market and, more importantly, vanished four month before the first public announcement of the
prospective conversion?). This illustrates a potential problem with event studies: it is difficult to
attribute changes in the relative value of shares to a particular event.
5.1.4. Optional conversion of Bashkirenergo preferred stock
Bashkirenergo is a regional power utility company serving 4 million people in the republic of
Bashkortostan. The company’s stock was originally split between common and preferred shares in
the proportion of 90 to 10%. By 2003, the proportion changed to 95 to 5%. Both classes have been
traded in the RTS since 1997.
The case of Bashkirenergo is interesting due to the nature of preferred stock of the company.
Besides standard characteristics (such as ten-percent-of-net-profit rule), from the time of
privatization onwards its preferred shares could be converted into ordinary ones at any transaction
at buyer’s will. This virtually made the preferred stock of the company a “super-preferred” stock.
From March 1997 to May 2003 there have been 2758 transactions with common shares and only 36
(in 30 trading days) with preferred ones. Between November 1997 and February 2002, there have
been only 5 trading days with transactions involving preferred stock of the company. The premium
on common shares is depicted in Fig. 6.
The graph shows that even “super-preferred” shares are not consistently traded with premium over
common stock. This is particularly surprising given the size of dividends paid on the two classes of
stock. Between 1995 and 2002 the dividend per preferred share was on average eight times larger
than the dividend per common share; in each separate year the ratio of the two dividends varied
from one to fifteen. Given the small number of transactions with Bashkirenergo preferred stock, its
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illiquidity seems to be a barrier for the rise of the preferred share price above the common share
price.
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Fig. 6. Bashkirenergo premium on common stock (unadjusted)
5.1.5. Conversion of Norilsk Nickel preferred stock
Norilsk Nickel is among the world’s leading producers of nickel and platinum. Its stock was
initially split between common and preferred shares in the proportion of 75 to 25%. Common and
preferred shares were traded since 1995 and 1996 respectively. The company was reorganized in
2001; the process implied a swap of shares of another company for both classes of Norilsk Nickel
shares.
From the time of privatization the charter of Norilsk Nickel contained the provision that preferred
shares could be converted into common ones (in proportion of one to one) after the sale of at least
one share from the block that the government reserved in state ownership. This event (a formal
privatization of the state block) occurred on August 5, 1997; since then the preferred stock became
convertible. The dynamics of the premium on common stock is shown in Fig. 7.
The effect of making preferred shares convertible is clear: the premium on common shares which
typically fluctuated in the range from 40% to 100% fell to the range from 0% to 20%. In some
periods, the premium was even negative.
5.1.6. A summary
The case study evidence provides some support for the control contest model of the premium
(GAZ) and hints on the relevance of the explanation based on liquidity differences (GAZ and
Bashkirenergo). A single case study of an apparent expropriation of preferred shareholders
(Avtovaz) fails to reveal any sizeable effect of expropriation on the premium. Moreover, this case
shows that the vetoing power of preferred shareholders is not necessarily an effective means to
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prevent expropriation. The case studies document the high importance of the convertibility option.
There is also an indication of the presence of an important common factor underlying the dynamics
of the premium in individual companies: similar dynamics is observed in the three companies
selected for the estimation of the market index, the premium in LUKoil did not deviate much from
the market index until late 1999, when information on prospective conversion presumably started to
leak from the company, the premium in GAZ follows the market fairly closely (except for the
takeover period).
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Fig. 7. Norilsk Nickel premium on common stock (unadjusted)
5.2. Econometric analysis
5.2.1. Data and sample description
A small number of observations are the major problem complicating regression analysis of the
premium on common shares in Russia. Though there have been over 150 companies with both
common and preferred shares listed in the RTS stock exchange between 1996 and 2003, in any
given year the number of companies whose preferred shares were more or less actively traded in the
market was several times smaller. This leaves the researcher with 50-60 observations of the
premium per year at best. A natural solution for the small sample problem is to use observations
from different periods (which results in pooled cross-sections or panel data).
The study is based on the sample embracing Russian companies whose common and preferred
shares of the companies listed in the RTS from 1997 to 2003.23 A particular company is included on
the basis of the following criteria:
1) it has issued two classes of stock;
                                                
23 Preferred stock appeared in the RTS only in September 1996. In principle, earlier data from over-the-counter market
may also be used, but only at the cost of loosing liquidity information.
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2) both common and preferred stock have been listed in the RTS stock exchange;
3) both common and preferred stocks have been traded between 10 February and 15 March the
same year at least once over the entire period 1997-2003.
4) the dividend on preferred shares of the company has been bounded below by the dividend on its
common shares.24
The period from mid-February to mid-March is chosen for two reasons. Firstly, a sensible
correction of share prices for expected dividends (they are likely to be incorporated in the prices) is
possible in this period: information about the performance of companies in the previous financial
year is released and provides a clue about dividends. One may simply assume that the market
anticipates future dividends correctly: the expectations coincide with the ex post dividends paid by
the companies. Secondly, the length of the period is motivated by the necessity to increase the
number of observations: the longer the period, the larger the number of companies in the sample.
An obvious shortcoming of this strategy is that with longer periods the difference in average-over-
the-period prices of the two classes of stock may be less informative, especially when one class of
shares is traded at the beginning of a period characterized by large changes of share prices while the
other class – at the end of the period.
A screening of the RTS data shows that 92 companies satisfy the mentioned restrictions on sample
selection. The total number of observations (firm-years) in the dataset is 264. Fifty-seven
companies out of 92 are observed at least twice during the seven year period. This gives a panel
with 229 observations. Thirty-five companies are observed only once.
Almost all data are publicly available in the Internet. As regards share prices and other information
concerning trading in the RTS, they are available on the RTS web-site (http://www.rts.ru).
Company data are available from quarterly reports to the FCSM and are downloadable from its
web-site (http://disclosure.fcsm.ru). Since quarterly reports of companies are available starting from
1998 at best, other sources such as company annual reports and financial press were occasionally
used to obtain missing data.
5.2.2. Econometric specification
Based on the theoretical considerations discussed above, the general functional relationship can be
expressed the following way:
VP = F (π, Φ, B/y, Expr, ∆Liquidity),  (3)
where VP is a premium on common shares, π, Φ, B/y are the variables in the control contest model
of the voting premium (2), Expr is a measure of expropriation risks facing preferred shareholders,
and ∆Liquidity is a measure of relative liquidity of preferred shares. This model contains several
variables that cannot be measured directly and for which there are no conventional proxies. The
                                                
24 This condition is needed in order to exclude preferred shares which promise a fixed amount dividend and therefore
resemble corporate bonds rather than non-voting stock.
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exact specification, therefore, critically depends on the ability to resolve a number of measurement
issues.
Variables in the control contest model of the voting premium. First and foremost, there is no
straightforward way to obtain the value of the Φ factor. Rydqvist (1987) was the first to use a
modified version of the Shapley value (Milnor and Shapley, 1978) to assess the probability that the
votes of small outside shareholders are pivotal for obtaining majority control over the firm. This
approach was applied in subsequent studies by Zingales (1994), Robinson et al. (1995), and Chung
and Kim (1999), among others. If approximated by the Shapley value, Φ equals zero when one
individual owns more than 50% of the votes, is small when one investor owns large but minority
fraction of votes and no others wield any significant block, and increases dramatically when two
shareholders own large fractions of votes and the pivotal votes are distributed among small
shareholders. The Φ factor, when approximated by the Shapley value, proves to be a statistically
significant explanatory variable in all mentioned studies. However, the theoretical foundations of
the Shapley value are not unquestionable (Zingales, 1995) and other proxies for the probability of a
contested takeover may be warranted.
Alternative approaches to measuring the probability of a takeover can be found, for example, in
Zingales (1994) and Smith and Amoako-Adu (1995). Zingales (1994) suggests two proxies: a
dummy equal to unity if one shareholder owns a majority of stock and zero otherwise and a dummy
equal to unity if there are at least two large shareholders but neither has a majority of votes. Smith
and Amoako-Adu (1995) use a vector of variables comprising ownership (the fraction of votes held
by insiders), size (measured as the logarithm of the market value of equity), and abnormal stock
return as a combined proxy for the Φ factor. The intuition behind the size factor is that larger
companies are less likely to be the targets in control contests since cost of obtaining control over
them is higher. Abnormal stock returns are used in order to measure company performance: it is
argued that poorly performing companies are more likely to be acquired because takeovers are a
means of replacing inefficient management.25
The validity of the Shapley value in the Russian case is problematic. The main reason is the
presence of controlling shareholders in most firms (84% in the sample) implying that the variable
takes too many zero values and has little explanatory power. Moreover, the Shapley value cannot be
measured precisely since only the upper tail of the distribution of ownership in each company is
known (the disclosure cut-off is 5%). As shown by Leech (1988), approximations of the Shapley
value contain a significant error when the ownership stake of the largest shareholder exceeds 30%.
But this is a typical case in Russia. In what follows, therefore, the Φ factor is approximated by (a)
majority control dummy, (b) a dummy for majority control by the state (and its affiliates) plus a
dummy for majority control by private shareholders, (c) the ownership stake of the largest
shareholder, (d) the difference between the ownership stake of the largest shareholders and the
second largest one. The intuition behind the last approximation is that the smaller the difference, the
                                                
25 This variable, however, proves to be statistically insignificant in the mentioned study.
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more valuable are the votes of small shareholders, in particular if the company is not majority
controlled.
The value of the private benefits of control, as already mentioned, is unobservable. For that reason
it is always omitted in regression analysis. There is, however, at least one opportunity to explicitly
take into account the variation of the relative size of the private benefits of control (B/y) across
Russian companies. This can be done by constructing a dummy which equals unity if a company
has introduced its shares to the US stock market by issuing American Depository Receipts (ADRs)
and zero otherwise. The rationale is as follows. A company that wants to issue ADRs has to adhere
to fairly strict disclosure rules in the US. Greater disclosure implies that the opportunities to extract
private benefits of control vanish. A more extensive discussion of the role of ADRs in reducing
private benefits of control is provided in Doidge (2003).
Dividend differences. Controlling for dividend differences across Russian companies represents a
challenge in the empirical analysis: dividends per common and preferred shares typically differ;
moreover, they are not functionally dependent on each other. One possibility is to subtract expected
dividends (which may be proxied by actual dividends the company pays ex post) from the prices of
common and preferred stock and to use the resulting values to calculate the premium:
)__(
)__()__(
pdivpprice
pdivppricecdivcpriceVPA
−
−−−
= ,  (4)
However, such adjustment is obviously imperfect because it ignores differences in future dividend
flows. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the ex ante expectations by the market concerning future
dividends coincide with the actual dividends paid by the companies ex post.26
Another possibility is to include a variable defined as the difference in dividends divided by the
price of preferred share as a control variable in the regression:
∆Dividends = (div_p – div_c)/price_p.  (5)
In addition, given that the dividend rights concerning preferred shares vary across companies, a
dummy variable which indicates if a company adheres to the ten-percent-of-net-profit rule can also
be included in the econometric model.
Liquidity. Since measuring liquidity of the two classes of stock on the basis of the volume of trade
or the number of transactions may be ambiguous, this paper uses the spread-based approach to
assess liquidity:
Liquidity = (pricea – priceb)/pricea,  (6)
where pricea and priceb denote ask and bid prices (closure) on the 1st of March each year or the
nearest trading date in case the stock exchange was closed on the 1st of March. Defined this way,
the variable takes any value in the (0; 1) interval and measures illiquidity of shares: the larger the
                                                
26 Another objection is little evidence of that share prices in Russia are corrected for the value of dividends when the ex-
dividend date passes (Securities Market, 2001).
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value, the lower liquidity. The relative liquidity of the two classes of stock is defined as a ratio or
difference between the estimated liquidities of the two classes, e.g., the following way:
∆Liquidity = Liquidity_c – Liquidity_p. (7)
Alternatively, one may include in the model two variables that measure the liquidity of each class of
stock separately.27
Expropriation risks facing non-voting shareholders. This factor cannot be measured directly. Yet
the vetoing power of preferred shareholders may serve as a reasonable proxy: if changes in the
corporate charter that concern preferred shares require supermajority approval by preferred
shareholders, the risk of expropriation is presumably lower than in the opposite case. A dummy
variable for the vetoing power is constructed; it equals unity for all companies starting from 2002
when the vetoing power of preferred shareholders was instituted in the corporate law.
Convertibility. The sample contains only three companies that in various periods provided preferred
shareholders with the opportunity to convert their preferred shares into common ones:
Bashkirenergo, Norilsk Nickel and LUKoil. Given the importance of the convertibility option
(which is documented in the case studies), the corresponding dummy variable is included in
specifications of the econometric model.
Based on the above and assuming a linear functional form, the basic specification of the model
looks as follows:
VPAit = α + β1(1/π)it + β2Controlit + β3ADRit + β4Vetoit + β5Liquidity_cit +
+ β6Liquidity_pit + β7Conversionit + year dummies + εit,  (8)
where the dependent variable measures the premium adjusted for expected dividends as in (4), 1/π
is the inverse of the fraction of common stock in company equity, Control denotes the control
dummy, ADR stands for the dummy for ADR issue, Veto is a dummy for the vetoing power of
preferred shareholders, Liquidity_c and Liquidity_p  measure liquidity of common and preferred
stock respectively – this is a more flexible specification than one with the variable for relative
liquidity defined in (7) – and the variable Conversion is a dummy for convertibility of preferred
shares. The model also includes period dummies to account for aggregate changes in the premium
over time (Wooldridge, 2002), with 1998 being the base year.
An alternative specification uses the dependent variable unadjusted for expected dividends (variable
VP) and a control variable for dividend differences ∆Dividends:
VPit = α + β1(1/π)it + β2Controlit + β3ADRit + β4Vetoit + β5Liquidity_cit +
+ β6Liquidity_pit + β7∆Dividendit + β8Conversionit + year dummies + εit. (9)
                                                
27 A reservation should be made that shares of many companies are traded in several stock exchanges (e.g., MICEX or
in the form of ADRs in the US). For many shares (especially common) most trade occurs outside RTS. As a result,
actual liquidity of shares may be higher than estimated from the RTS data.
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Definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 3 and their descriptive statistics are reported in
Appendix 4.
5.2.3. Estimation results
Given the nature of the data (264 observations of which 229 form an unbalanced panel), two
estimation methods – pooled OLS or fixed/random effects estimation – may be applied. The latter
method can only use 229 observations that form a panel sub-sample while the pooled OLS
estimation allows to take advantage of the entire dataset. Given the small number of observations,
the difference may be important. In what follows, results from the pooled OLS estimation are
reported. In all regressions, standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
within clusters (firms).28 Further, the models (8) and (9) are modified to exclude the first
explanatory variable: it has low variation both across companies and over time so that the
coefficient β1 can hardly be estimated. The decisions to use pooled OLS and to omit the first
variable are discussed in more detail in section 5.2.4.
#Regression results are shown in Appendix 5. Table A5.1 contains results from estimating the
benchmark model as in (8) and its variations where the variable Control is replaced with other
proxies for the probability of contested takeover, Φ. Results in column (R1) show statistically
significant coefficients on the convertibility dummy and on the variable capturing liquidity of
preferred shares (though not of common shares). The coefficients on the majority control dummy,
the ADR dummy as well as on the dummy for the vetoing power of preferred shareholders have the
expected negative signs, but are not statistically significant. Period dummies are jointly statistically
significant at one percent level (not reported).
Regression (R2) is intended to check whether the premium depends on the identity of the
controlling owner. The underlying hypothesis is that the premium on common shares is larger in
companies that are controlled by the state – future privatizations may dramatically alter control
structures in these firms. Therefore, the variable that reflects majority control is decomposed into
two variables: one for control by the state (widely defined, including government-controlled state
holding companies) and another one for control by private shareholders. The coefficients on the
both variables are negative, but statistically insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence that majority
control by the state is less stable than majority control by private owners. All other coefficients do
not change much compared to regression (R1).
Regressions in columns (R3) – (R6) use continuous ownership variables instead of the control
dummies to proxy for the probability of a takeover. Regression (R3) shows that the premium is
negatively related to the ownership stake of the largest shareholder (variable Owner1). The
respective coefficient is only significant at 10% level, however. Regression (R4) checks if this
relationship depends on whether a company is majority-controlled or not: the ownership stake of the
largest shareholder is interacted with the control dummy and the resulting variable is included in the
                                                
28 Accounting for serial correlation among the residuals referring to the same company slightly reduces the statistical
significance of the coefficients compared to the standard Huber/White/sandwich heteroscedasticity-robust estimator.
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model. There no evidence of a non-linear relationship: though the coefficient on the Owner1
variable increases in absolute value and becomes significant at 5% level, the coefficient on the
product of the two variables statistically insignificant. Numerically, the relationship implies that a
one percentage point increase in the ownership stake of the largest shareholder reduces the premium
by 1.5 percentage points.
Regression (R5) proxies the probability of a takeover by the difference between the ownership stakes of
the largest shareholder and the second largest one (variable Owners1-2). The underlying hypothesis is
that the closer the fractions of shares held by the two largest shareholders, the higher the probability of a
control fight. Hence, the premium should increase when the difference become smaller resulting in a
balance of power between the two largest shareholders. This hypothesis is supported by the data: the
coefficient on the variable of interest is negative and statistically significant (at 5% level).29 A further
check is performed in regression (R6). Regression (R6) is the same as (R5), but contains the product of
the variable Owners1_2 with the dummy for no majority control. One may expect that the difference
between the ownership stakes of the two largest shareholders only matter as long as the largest owner
does not have a majority control. Having obtained 50% of votes, he enjoys full control and the fraction
of stock held by the second largest owner becomes irrelevant. This is not supported by the data,
however. The coefficient on the product of the two variables is statistically insignificant while the
coefficient on the variable Owners1_2 is only marginally affected. Regardless of whether the largest
shareholder has majority control or not, the difference between his fraction of ownership and the
fraction of the second largest shareholder seems to have the same effect on the premium. Numerically, if
the discrepancy between the ownership stakes of the two largest shareholders raises by one percentage
point, the premium declines by 0.8 percentage points on average.
Estimation of the second benchmark model (9) yields similar results (not reported). In particular,
convertibility of preferred shares and liquidity of preferred stock remain the major explanations of
the premium. The coefficient on liquidity of preferred shares becomes somewhat smaller than in the
first benchmark model (8), and the coefficient on liquidity of common shares becomes marginally
significant at 10% level. The proxies for the probability of takeover behave the same way as before
with the ownership stake of the largest owner as well as the difference between the ownership
stakes of the largest and the second largest shareholders being the best explanatory variables. The
coefficient on the ADR dummy is negative, but statistically insignificant. The vetoing power of
preferred shareholders does not contribute to explaining the premium. Finally, the coefficient on the
control variable that is supposed to capture the difference in dividends between common and
preferred shares is negative and statistically significant at 1% level (the greater the dividend
advantages of preferred shares, the lower the premium).
Table A5.2 shows estimation results for specification (R5) in Table A5.1 augmented with additional
company-level variables: a dummy for temporal enfranchisement of preferred shares, a dummy for
                                                
29 The ownership stake of the second largest shareholder per se has no effect on the premium as follows from the
specification where this variable is included alongside the ownership stake of the largest owner (not reported).
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 32
the ten-percent-of-net-profit dividend on preferred stock and a measure of company size (log
market capitalization). The results are virtually the same regardless of what method of differential
dividends correction is used – an additional regressor as in (R1) – (R3) or adjusting share prices as
in (R4) – (R6). The coefficients on the temporal enfranchisement dummy and the dummy for the
ten-percent-of-net-profit rule are not significant. The inclusion of the proxy for company size (log
market capitalization) that may capture the cost, and hence the probability, of a takeover, does not
change the results much.
5.2.4. A note on estimation
The fact that the dataset is not a panel (35 companies are observed only once during the seven-year
period) provides a reason to use pooled OLS. The use of OLS, however, may lead to biased
estimates if there are unobserved characteristics of firms correlated with the dependent variable and
any of the right-hand-side variables in the model. A sub-sample of the original dataset that forms a
panel provides an opportunity to test the appropriateness of OLS estimation.
Columns R1 and R2 in Table A5.3 show results of estimating parameters of the basic model (8) by
OLS using the full sample and the panel sub-sample. The results are fairly similar. Columns R3 and
R4 show results obtained on the panel sub-sample using both fixed and random effects estimators.
The F-test reject fixed effects at 5% level though not at 10% level. Hausman test shows no
statistically significant difference between the coefficient obtained from the random and fixed
effects estimators, which is normally interpreted as evidence of that the random effects estimator is
justified (the estimates are consistent). Second, a Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test is
run to test for the presence of random effects. These are rejected. Overall, the tests provide no
evidence of unobserved effects that may bias OLS estimates; hence, OLS estimator appears to be
justified.
As pointed out above, the variable 1/π has a low variance. An attempt to estimate the full model
such as (8) shows that the variable has little explanatory power but causes multicollinearity with the
constant term (this is shown in the column R5, Table A5.3). This is the reason why the basic model
(8) is modified to exclude the 1/π variable. The modification only marginally changes the estimated
parameters of the model except for the constant term.
5.2.5. A summary
The regression analysis provides reasonable support for the relevance of the control contest model
of the premium. Most evidence comes from specifications that use continuous data on ownership to
proxy for the probability of contested takeovers. A more conventional proxy for the probability of a
control contest – the majority control dummy – does not work, even if disaggregated into two
dummies – one for majority control by the state and another one for the majority control by private
owners. The coefficients on these variables are statistically insignificant, though their magnitudes
(of the order of 10 to 40%) are not negligible from the economic viewpoint.
The most remarkable result related to the control contest model is as follows: the larger the
difference between the ownership stake of the largest shareholder and the stake of the second
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largest one, the smaller the voting premium. In particular, reducing the discrepancy between the
ownership stakes of the two largest shareholders by one percentage point tends to increase the
premium by 0.8 percentage points on average. This relationship would provide an immediate
support for the control contest model of the premium were it observed only in companies that do
not have a controlling shareholder. A puzzle is that this result holds for all companies regardless of
the presence of controlling owner. This hints on the importance of significant minority ownership
stakes. The result can be rationalized if large minority investors have bargaining power and enjoy
private benefits regardless of whether the company is majority controlled or not (this interpretation
was earlier suggested by Nicodano (1998)). For example, if a minority shareholder has a
representative in the corporate board (this is not unlikely given that the boards in Russia are elected
by cumulative voting), he may affect corporate decisions that require unanimous approval by the
board.
The regression analysis does not say anything in favor of the expropriation hypothesis. Yet the
result is hardly a convincing evidence of that the expropriation of preferred shareholders is
irrelevant; it may well be due to the failure to find a good proxy for such expropriation. For
example, if preferred shareholders are very small, they tend to free ride at shareholder meetings and
not use their conditional voting right to prevent “class rights” changes or other cases of
expropriation. Testing the relevance of this explanation would require detailed data on the
distribution of preferred shares, but they are not available. The vetoing power of preferred
shareholders may also turn out to be a bad proxy for the expropriation risk in case of ineffective
enforcement of law, when the vetoing right can be ignored by common shareholders.
Liquidity (in particular, liquidity of preferred shares) is the most important determinant of the
premium, apart from convertibility of preferred stock. The impact of liquidity is fairly robust across
various specifications and the variation of the premium that liquidity may cause is substantial and
exceeds 100%. The conversion option matters a lot, but this result is expected and is trivial from the
economic viewpoint.
Some company-specific characteristics such as the ten-percent-of-net-profit rule, (temporary)
enfranchisement, and the issue of ADRs have no effect on the premium. As regards ADR
issues, the coefficient on the corresponding variable has the expected negative sign; the fact that
it is statistically insignificant may stem from a high correlation observed between the variable
for ADR issue and the variables for liquidity (the issue of ADR raises liquidity of both classes
of shares).
Finally, it has to be mentioned that the period dummies and the dummy for convertibility of
preferred stock account for the lion’s share of explained variation of the premium. A simple model
without any firm-level regressors (only with the period dummies) explains about one-third of the
variation in the premium. Adding the convertibility dummy increases the fraction of explained
variation to 40% while including all other (company-specific) regressors raises R-squared to 50% at
best. Highly significant period dummies suggest that some of the substantive determinants of the
time-series variation of the premium have not been uncovered in the regression analysis.
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 34
6. CONCLUSION
Empirical analysis provides certain support for the hypothesis that the premium is related to the
private benefits of control and the probability of control fights. This is despite the fact that
takeovers have been exceptional, rather than typical, events in the Russian stock market, primarily
due to the highly concentrated ownership structures in the publicly traded companies. A single case
study of a contested takeover shows the relevance of control changes for the magnitude of the
premium in Russia. Econometric analysis shows that the premium on voting shares is high when the
two largest shareholders are of similar size (and may eventually start a control fight) and is low
when the ownership stake of the second largest shareholder is substantially smaller than that of the
largest one.
The study provides no support for the hypothesis that the premium is related to expropriation of
preferred shareholders as a class.
The econometric analysis uses the cross-company variation of the vetoing power of preferred
shareholders in case their “class rights” are concerned as a proxy for the expropriation risk.
Theoretically, such conditional vetoing power should reduce the expropriation risk facing non-
voting shareholders. However, the premium turns out to be unaffected by this factor. The result may
testify either to that the expropriation of preferred shareholders is irrelevant or that the proxy for the
expropriation risk employed in the study is imperfect. In particular, the vetoing power is an
imperfect proxy for the expropriation risk when preferred shareholders are too dispersed and the
free rider problem is severe, as well as when the vetoing right is badly enforced. The second
conjecture is supported by evidence from a single case study showing that the rights of preferred
shareholders may be de facto changed without their consent even if the latter is legally required.
The explanation based on liquidity finds considerable support – indirectly in the case studies and
explicitly in the econometric analysis. In particular, the premium raises with illiquidity of preferred
stock, the result is significant both statistically and economically.
Yet the control contest model of the voting premium and the liquidity story do not explain much of
the variation of the premium, especially over time. The impact of firm-specific characteristics turns
out to be of minor importance compared to the impact of a hidden common factor which is
presumably related to changing economic and institutional environment. In particular, the premium
is related to the 1998 financial crisis in Russia: the highest values are observed in the two year
period following the default. Such dynamics may be a consequence of an increase in the relative
size of private benefits of control, which may stem from increased incentives for expropriation in
the economic downturn (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) or from weaker restraints on the extraction of
private benefits due to the decline in the quality of law enforcement in Russia between 1998 and
2000 (EBRD, various years). An exact answer to the question of what determines a significant
variation of the premium over time requires further research.
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APPENDICES
A1. Dual class stock: share prices and dividends
Table A1.1 Prices of common and preferred shares, USD*
Company 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Surgutneftegaz common 0.58 0.15 0.07 0.29 0.24 0.34 0.32
(SNGS) preferred 0.39 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.21 0.23
premium 50% 74% 282% 175% 113% 59% 36%
LUKoil common 13.69 18.09 3.86 12.57 10.62 14.16 14.51
(LKOH) preferred 10.49 12.90 1.68 5.87 10.95 n/a** n/a**
premium 31% 40% 129% 114% -3% n/a n/a
Unified Energy common 0.14 0.25 0.03 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.12
Systems (EESR) preferred 0.10 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.10
premium 34% 48% 129% 155% 154% 34% 20%
Norilsk Nickel common 6.38 5.51 0.66 7.16 8.56 15.59 n/a****
(NKEL) preferred 4.02 4.95 n/a*** 6.48 8.32 n/a*** n/a****
premium 59% 11% n/a 10% 3% n/a n/a
Rostelecom common 2.90 2.96 0.75 2.54 1.01 1.03 1.23
(RTKM) preferred 2.24 2.10 0.28 0.80 0.42 0.53 0.83
premium 30% 41% 170% 219% 139% 94% 49%
* Weighted-average prices as of January each year, data from the RTS Stock Exchange.
** Preferred shares were converted into common ones.
*** Not traded in the market in the specified period.
**** Swapped for another company shares.
Table A1.2. Dividends per common and preferred shares (USD)*
Company 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Surgutneftegaz common 0.0062 0.0012 0.0004 0.0007 0.0014 0.0011 0.0010
(SNGS) preferred 0.0229 0.0043 0.0004 0.0030 0.0063 0.0032 0.0030
com. to pr. 27% 27% 100% 23% 23% 33% 33%
LUKoil common 0.0528 0.0362 0.0109 0.1047 0.2795 0.4848 0.6176
(LKOH) preferred 0.1761 0.1499 0.1168 0.6091 2.0671 n/a n/a
com. to pr. 30% 24% 9% 17% 14% n/a n/a
Unified Energy common 0.0009 0.0008 0.0003 0.0005 0.0007 0.0008 0.0011
Systems (EESR) preferred 0.0009 0.0015 0.0007 0.0013 0.0026 0.0038 0.0092
com. to pr. 100% 55% 41% 36% 27% 22% 12%
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 36
Company 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Norilsk Nickel common 0 0 0 0.0094 0.0542 0.0556 n/a
(NKEL) preferred 0.0004 0.0016 0 0.0094 0.0542 0.0556 n/a
com. to pr. 0% 0% n/a 100% 100% n/a n/a
Rostelecom common 0 0.0135 0 0.0057 0.0057 0.0069 0.0171
(RTKM) preferred 0.0837 0.0945 0 0.0282 0.0148 0.0297 0.0402
com. to pr. 0% 14% n/a 20% 39% 23% 43%
* Dividends from the last financial year to be paid in the current year, Ruble values adjusted using USD/RUR exchange rates as of
March 1.
A2. A proxy for the market premium
The market premium on common stock is calculated as the equally-weighted average of the
premium for three companies: Unified Energy Systems (EESR), Surgutneftegaz (SNGS), and
Rostelecom (RTKM). The following criteria underlie the choice of these companies: their common
and preferred shares have been the most liquid over the entire period (with the smallest number of
missing observations); they represent the most traded sectors of the economy – power utilities,
oil&gas, and telecommunications; the status of their preferred stock as well as its share in corporate
equity did not change much in 1997-2003 so that the impact of idiosyncratic changes on the
premium has been minimal. The series are depicted in fig. A1 (missing observations have been
interpolated); the market premium is shown in fig. A2.
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Fig. A2.1. Common stock premium for EESR, SNGS and RTKM.
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Fig. A2.2. Estimated market premium on common stock.
A3. Definition of variables
VP – the voting premium (unadjusted for dividends), defined as the difference between the price of
common share and the price of preferred share divided by the latter, measured in percentage points.
Average prices for the period from 10 February to 15 March are used.
VPA – the same as above, but share prices are adjusted for the size of dividends the companies are
expected to pay (actual dividends paid by firms are used as approximation for expected dividends).
π – the fraction of common shares outstanding.
Liquidity_c – a measure of liquidity of common shares defined on the basis of bid-ask spreads;
equals the difference between the ask and bid prices divided by the ask price. Bid and ask prices are
taken on the 1st of March or closest available trading date. Note: higher value of the variable means
lower liquidity.
Liquidity_p – a measure of liquidity of preferred shares. See above.
∆Liquidity – difference in liquidity; Liq_p – Liq_c.
∆Dividend – the difference in dividends on preferred and common shares; equals to the difference
between the dividend on preferred share and the dividend on common share divided by the price of
preferred share.
Control – a dummy for majority control (50% of voting shares or more in the hands of a single
shareholder).
Control_st – a dummy for majority control by the state (50% of voting shares or more).
Control_pr – a dummy for majority control by a private shareholder (50% of voting shares or
more).
No_Control – a dummy for no majority control by a single shareholder.
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Owner1 – the ownership fraction of the largest shareholder.
Owner1-2 – the difference between the ownership stakes of the two largest owners.
Conversion – a dummy for convertible preferred shares.
Div10 – a dummy for ten-percent-of-net-profit rule applied to dividends on preferred shares.
Veto – a dummy for the vetoing power of preferred shareholders.
ADR – a dummy for ADR issue.
Vote – a dummy for temporary enfranchisement of preferred stock.
ln(capitaliz) – log capitalization measured in million rubles.
A4. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
VP overall 118.138 90.232 -26.581 499.984
between 77.973 5.182 476.923
within 66.887 -62.637 353.760
VPA overall 137.849 103.558 -26.581 567.113
between 86.214 8.563 527.212
within 78.498 -50.915 467.299
π overall 0.789 0.060 0.750 0.963
between 0.053 0.750 0.963
within 0.014 0.707 0.892
Control overall 0.845 0.363 0 1
between 0.341 0 1
within 0.162 -0.012 1.645
Control_st overall 0.742 0.438 0 1
between 0.445 0 1
within 0.105 -0.115 1.142
Control_pr overall 0.102 0.304 0 1
between 0.310 0 1
within 0.156 -0.469 0.902
Owner1 overall 41.288 9.193 9.448 75.750
between 9.769 14.400 69.520
within 2.844 21.765 57.448
Owner1-2 overall 27.852 13.027 0.050 74.450
between 13.011 0.050 63.057
within 5.880 4.524 56.812
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ADR overall 0.273 0.446 0 1
between 0.319 0 1
within 0.240 -0.584 1.073
Veto overall 0.538 0.500 0 1
between 0.438 0 1
within 0.305 -0.129 1.371
Liquidity_c overall 0.174 0.174 0.001 0.940
between 0.167 0.006 0.793
within 0.105 -0.209 0.765
Liquidity_p overall 0.240 0.225 0.003 0.990
between 0.209 0.022 0.867
within 0.147 -0.128 0.839
∆Dividend overall 0.061 0.088 0 0.600
between 0.058 0 0.287
within 0.072 -0.164 0.553
Conversion overall 0.030 0.172 0 1
between 0.134 0 1
within 0.078 -0.770 0.830
Vote overall 0.083 0.277 0 1
between 0.270 0 1
within 0.192 -0.583 0.940
Div10 overall 0.936 0.246 0 1
between 0.238 0 1
within 0.087 0.269 1.602
Ln(capitaliz) overall 7.915 1.744 4.267 12.955
between 1.560 4.762 11.707
within 0.613 6.097 9.666
Descriptive statistics: 1997
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
VP 37 55.846 29.013 -14.071 121.213
VPA 37 71.475 45.910 -11.045 238.146
π 37 0.780 0.058 0.750 0.953
Control 37 0.919 0.277 0 1
Control_st 37 0.730 0.450 0 1
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Control_pr 37 0.189 0.397 0 1
Owner1 37 41.029 6.449 24.790 53.000
Owner1-2 37 31.263 10.349 4.490 50.978
ADR 37 0.081 0.277 0 1
Veto 37 0.351 0.484 0 1
Liquidity_c 37 0.137 0.127 0.004 0.539
Liquidity_p 37 0.175 0.189 0.003 0.690
∆Dividend 37 0.066 0.112 0.000 0.600
Conversion 37 0.027 0.164 0 1
Vote 37 0.027 0.164 0 1
Div10 37 1 0 1 1
Ln(capitaliz) 37 7.611 1.320 4.831 10.992
Descriptive statistics: 2003
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
VP 37 73.586 39.533 4.392 155.866
VPA 37 79.183 41.304 12.983 176.178
π 37 0.801 0.054 0.750 0.952
Control 37 0.865 0.347 0 1
Control_st 37 0.757 0.435 0 1
Control_pr 37 0.108 0.315 0 1
Owner1 37 45.559 10.611 20.680 74.240
Owner1-2 37 29.268 16.057 2.000 72.930
ADR 37 0.378 0.492 0 1
Veto 37 1.000 0.000 1 1
Liquidity_c 37 0.115 0.142 0.001 0.537
Liquidity_p 37 0.138 0.142 0.013 0.571
∆Dividend 37 0.018 0.023 0 0.076
Conversion 37 0.000 0.000 0 0
Vote 37 0.162 0.374 0 1
Div10 37 0.892 0.315 0 1
Ln(capitaliz) 37 8.963 1.466 6.684 12.946
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A5. Regression results
Table A5.1. Determinants of the premium (adjusted for dividend differences): k pooled OLS estimates
Dependent var.: VPA (R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) (R5) (R6)
Control -19.832
(-0.86)
Control_st -17.178
(-0.75)
Control_pr -37.71
(-1.36)
Owner1 -1.41 -1.537
(-1.84) (-2.16)
Owner1×no_Control -0.209
(-0.37)
Owner1-2 -0.845 -0.829
(-1.97) (-2.00)
Owner1-2×no_Control 0.233
(0.27)
ADR -10.702 -11.642 -12.85 -12.629 -9.849 -10.216
(-0.86) (-0.94) (-1.08) (-1.04) (-0.83) (-0.85)
Veto -7.151 -8.7 4.128 5.676 0.811 0.254
(-0.45) (-0.54) (0.28) (0.36) (0.05) (0.02)
Liquidity_c -71.087 -70.761 -71.493 -73.774 -76.488 -74.632
(-1.37) (-1.37) (-1.43) (-1.44) (-1.55) (-1.50)
Liquidity_p 152.175 148.939 149.289 150.236 157.2 156.512
(3.42) (3.32) (3.40) (3.39) (3.65) (3.64)
Conversion -166.609 -161.897 -161.698 -158.283 -156.875 -159.726
(-7.11) (-6.65) (-8.83) (-7.96) (-10.60) (-8.99)
Intercept 154.324 155.303 191.926 197.306 158.483 157.877
(5.23) (5.26) (5.29) (5.93) (7.74) (7.88)
Number of obs. 264 264 264 264 264 264
R-squared 0.466 0.469 0.475 0.475 0.472 0.472
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Table A5.2. Determinants of the premium: pooled OLS estimates with additional regressors
(R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) (R5) (R6)
Dependent var.: VPA VPA VPA VP VP VP
Owner1-2 -0.845 -0.845 -0.844 -0.83 -0.839 -0.842
(-1.97) (-1.92) (-1.90) (-2.09) (-2.08) (-2.06)
ADR -9.849 -8.462 -8.242 -10.135 -9.866 -10.652
(-0.83) (-0.71) (-0.61) (-0.93) (-0.89) (-0.85)
Veto 0.811 0.49 0.624 -4.378 -4.517 -4.998
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.39)
Liquidity_c -76.488 -70.332 -70.902 -82.944 -77.718 -75.733
(-1.55) (-1.42) (-1.40) (-1.88) (-1.74) (-1.67)
Liquidity_p 157.2 155.189 154.667 127.64 126.385 128.244
(3.65) (3.62) (3.52) (3.55) (3.51) (3.37)
Conversion -156.875 -155.434 -155.18 -144.213 -142.369 -143.275
(-10.60) (-9.97) (-9.39) (-8.71) (-8.67) (-8.18)
Vote 8.189 8.278 -3.198 -3.52
(0.35) (0.34) (-0.20) (-0.22)
Div10 -13.539 -13.762 -11.543 -10.748
(-0.90) (-0.88) (-0.87) (-0.77)
Ln(capitaliz) -0.215 0.769
(-0.05) (0.19)
∆Dividend -153.029 -152.302 -151.92
(-2.81) (-2.75) (-2.71)
Intercept 158.483 170.324 172.164 157.509 168.35 161.76
(7.74) (6.82) (4.02) (8.84) (8.04) (4.11)
Number of  obs. 264 264 264 264 264 264
R-squared 0.472 0.474 0.474 0.474 0.475 0.475
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Table A5.3. Comparison of various methods of estimation
(R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) (R5)
Dependent var.: VPA
OLS
(full sample)
OLS
(panel)
FE RE
OLS
(full sample)
Owner1-2 -0.845 -1.074 -0.379 -0.914 -0.853
(-1.97) (-2.34) (-0.46) (-2.15) (-1.96)
ADR -9.849 -8.994 15.786 -5.935 -11.109
(-0.83) (-0.73) (0.72) (-0.43) (-0.84)
Veto 0.811 2.198 -8.772 2.677 -1.698
(0.05) (0.15) (-0.37) (0.19) (-0.10)
Liquidity_c -76.488 -102.49 -54.68 -97.445 -73.892
(-1.55) (-1.76) (-0.94) (-2.16) (-1.49)
Liquidity_p 157.2 166.243 99.252 158.649 156.138
(3.65) (3.37) (2.27) (4.55) (3.61)
Conversion -156.875 -161.407 -124.809 -156.544 -161.591
(-10.60) (-12.22) (-2.08) (-5.15) (-8.35)
Year 1997 -72.835 -61.138 -60.33 -61.697 -72.806
(-5.47) (-4.60) (-3.42) (-3.67) (-5.44)
Year 1999 26.83 31.916 66.465 37.07 25.395
(0.85) (0.97) (2.34) (1.45) (0.78)
Year 2000 69.044 72.208 80.151 73.77 68.734
(3.61) (3.85) (4.57) (4.40) (3.59)
Year 2001 27.555 42.317 38.525 41.905 27.071
(1.27) (1.86) (2.09) (2.46) (1.26)
Year 2002 -58.675 -52.401 -54.143 -53.202 -57.053
(-3.63) (-3.26) (-2.31) (-2.82) (-3.38)
Year 2003 -64.528 -65.057 -71.325 -67.34 -63.759
(-3.74) (-3.77) (-3.00) (-3.41) (-3.60)
1/π -33.606
(-0.42)
Intercept 158.483 160.238 143.328 155.466 202.926
(7.74) (7.70) (4.77) (8.25) (1.77)
Number of obs. 264 229 229 229 264
R-squared 0.472 0.484 0.492 0 0.473
Hausman test: RE vs FE Prob > Chi2 =
= 0.2768
Breusch & Pagan test for RE Prob > Chi2 =
= 0.4268
F-test for FE Prob > F =
= 0.0581
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